共謀の文化－The Nuclear Power Village

Culture of Complicity Tied to Stricken Nuclear Plant

New York Times By NORIMITSU ONISHI and KEN BELSON  Published: April 26, 2011

＜＜　記事抜粋　＞＞

“It’s all about money,” he added.
At Fukushima Daiichi and elsewhere, critics say that safety problems have stemmed from a common source: a watchdog that is a member of  The Nuclear Power Village.
Though it is charged with oversight, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency is part of the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry, the bureaucracy charged with promoting the use of nuclear power. Over a long career, officials are often transferred repeatedly between oversight and promotion divisions, blurring the lines between supporting and policing the industry.
監視がその役割であるにもかかわらず原子力安全保安院は経産省の一部門だ。しかもメンバーは推進側と監視側を何度も行き来している。

Revolving Door（回転ドア）

In Japan, the web of connections between the nuclear industry and government officials is now popularly referred to as the “nuclear power village.”

日本においてはこの民間原子力事業者と政府官僚のコネクションネットワークは、「原子力村」と呼ばれるようになっている。

Just as in any Japanese village, the like-minded － nuclear industry officials, bureaucrats, politicians and scientists － have prospered by rewarding one another with construction projects, lucrative positions, and political, financial and regulatory support. 

原子力事業者、官僚、政治家と学界で構成されるムラは建設プロジェクトによって、政治的・金銭的そして規制において有利なポジションを獲得することでお互いが潤うようになっている。

At Tepco, from 1959 to 2010, four former top-ranking ministry officials successively served as vice presidents at the company. When one retired from Tepco, his junior from the ministry took over what is known as the ministry’s “reserved seat” of vice president at the company.
東電はこの５０年で４人の政府高官が天下り「指定席の副社長」に就いた。
In the most recent case, a director general of the ministry’s Natural Resources and Energy Agency, Toru Ishida, left the ministry last year and joined Tepco early this year as an adviser. Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s government initially defended the appointment but reversed itself after the Communist Party publicized the extent of amakudari appointments since the 1960s. Mr. Ishida, who would have normally become vice president later this year, was forced to step down last week.
最近では資源エネ庁の石田長官が本年、将来の副社長就任を見据えた顧問に就任した。事故後辞任することになったが。
（英文略）
米国のＮＲＣや研究機関、事業者との間では考えられない関係が原子力村にはある。日本の学界で安全性などで原子力村に批判的意見を述べることは、その経済的なまた研究者としての地位を危険にさらすことになる

Backed by Keidanren - Japan’s biggest business lobby, of which Tepco is one of the biggest members - Mr. Kano served two six-year terms in the upper house of Parliament until 2010. In a move that has raised eyebrows even in a world of cross-fertilizing interests, he has returned to Tepco as an adviser.
経団連の後押しを受けて、東電元副社長加納時男は２０１０年まで参議院議員を２期務め、東電顧問に戻った。
While in office, Mr. Kano led a campaign to reshape the country’s energy policy by putting nuclear power at its center. He held leadership positions on energy committees that recommended policies long sought by the nuclear industry, like the use of a fuel called mixed oxide, or mox, in fast-breeder reactors. He also opposed the deregulation of the power industry.
加納時男氏は議員活動中、国のエネルギー政策に深く関わり原子力推進の中心メンバーだった。ＭＯＸ燃料導入についても指導力を発揮し、電力自由化に反対してきた。

Most important, in 2003, on the strength of Mr. Kano’s leadership, Japan adopted a national basic energy plan calling for the growth of nuclear energy as a way to achieve greater energy independence and to reduce Japan’s emission of greenhouses gases. The plan and subsequent versions mentioned only in broad terms the importance of safety at the nation’s nuclear plants despite the 2002 disclosure of cover-ups at Fukushima Daiichi and a 1999 accident at a plant northeast of Tokyo in which high levels of radiation were spewed into the air.
さらに重要なことに２００３年-この年は東電が福島及び柏崎で放射能漏れ事故を起こしてデータ改竄が発覚した翌年であるにも関わらず－加納氏の強いリーダーシップの元で国の原子力エネルギーへの傾斜政策が採用された。

Mr. Kano’s legislative activities drew criticism even from some members of his own party.
“He rewrote everything in favor of the power companies,” Mr. Kono said.
What is more, Japan would make the sale of nuclear reactors and technology the central component of a long-term export strategy to energy-hungry developing nations. A new company, the International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan, was created to do just that. Its shareholders were made up of the country’s nine main nuclear plant operators, three manufacturers of nuclear reactors and the government itself.
The nuclear power village was going global with the new company. The government took a 10 percent stake. Tepco took the biggest, with 20 percent, and one of its top executives was named the company’s first president.
さらに日本は原子力発電主要部分及び技術の販売を長期的国家輸出戦略と定めた。電力会社および原子力主要企業３社と国の出資による新たな企業が設立されている。
原子力村はこの新たな企業－政府１０％、東電２０％の出資と東電からの新社長送り込み－によってグローバル化を図ろうとしている。